We propose a novel quantum key distribution scheme that uses the blind polarization basis. In our scheme the sender and the receiver share key information by exchanging qubits with arbitrary polarization angles without basis reconciliation. The two-way communication compensates the polarization distortion during the fiber transmission while randomness of Bob's and Alice's unitary transformations makes the coding impossible to eavesdrop. As only random polarizations are transmitted, our protocol is secure even when a key is embedded in a not-so-weak coherent-state pulse.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] , whose security is guaranteed by the laws of physics, has attracted widespread attention as it is ultimately secure and does not require computational and mathematical complexity unlike its classical counterparts, such as the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman coding and the DiffieHellman coding [7] . Since the seminal work of a QKD protocol (BB84) by Bennett and Brassard [1] , there have been various theoretical proposals, experimental realizations and their security proofs [2] .
There are many ways to classify QKD schemes. One possibility is to classify it into two categories: one is to use an entangled state [3] and the other is to use single photons or weak coherent pulses [1, 4] . There have been efforts to set a security proof based on entanglement for the both classes [5] . Recently, the continuous-variable QKD [6] has also been proved to be a promising protocol to send secret keys with high transmission rate.
The QKD is one of the most promising applications of quantum information science and the gap between theory and practice has become narrower. In practical singlephoton QKD, the source sometimes inevitably produces more than one photon at a time. In this case, the QKD is vulnerable to the photon number splitting (PNS) attack in which an eavesdropper (Eve) splits photons from the many-photon field and keeps them. Eve measures her photons when the bases are announced via the classical channel. The PNS attack is not always the best strategy, for example, as the photon cloning attack can sometimes be more powerful. The two attacks were compared in [8] .
In photon-polarization QKD, one of the important practical problems is polarization distortion due to the birefringence effect during the transmission through a fiber. Under the assumption that all the polarization distortion processes are unitary, Muller et al. [9] suggested the so-called plug-and-play QKD, which employs two-way communication (hence the name). A unique property of the Faraday mirror is that at any point along the fiber, the state of polarization of the forward going and reflected light are always orthogonal to each other. By placing Faraday mirrors to reflect a signal field at Alice's station, the polarization disturbances are compensated. As usual, Alice and Bob are the legitimate owners of the keys. Recently Boström and Felder [10] came up with a conceptually new type of quantum secret coding, which allows information to be transmitted in a deterministic secure way, based on entanglement and two-way communication. This direct quantum coding protocol, sometimes called the ping-pong protocol, has been extended to the single-photon implementation [11] and its security was extensively studied [12] .
In this paper, we propose a new QKD scheme in which the basis reconciliation via a classical channel is not necessary as an advantage. In this QKD scheme, Alice chooses a random value of angle θ and prepares the photon state with the polarization of that angle. Bob also chooses another random value of angle φ and further rotates the polarization direction of the received photon by φ and then returns to Alice. Alice encodes the message by rotating the polarization angle by ±π/4 after compensating the angle by −θ. Bob reads the bit by measuring the polarization, after compensating the angle by −φ. Alice and Bob shall choose random angles, θ and φ, for each transmission of qubits. This will be continued until the desired number of bits are created.
The important advantages of our protocol are manifold: 1) The reconciliation of the polarization basis is not necessary. The strong point of our protocol is that the selected polarization angles θ and θ + φ are not necessary to discuss with each other as Bob and Alice do not need to know the other's polarization basis. Moreover, this may significantly increase the bit creation rate compared to the BB84 protocol and, in an ideal case, enables the direct quantum coding. 2) Our protocol is one of the more sophisticated two-way QKD's, which are robust against polarization deformation through the fiber transmission of the signal due to the unavoidable birefringence effect in the fiber. In most other two-way QKD's, the receiver sends a random qubit and the key sender randomly decides one of the two sets of unitary operations on it. The unitary operation then becomes the key in the two-way QKD. A problem with this scheme is that the key may be disclosed to an eavesdropper who sends a spy photon along with the receiver's random photon traveling to the sender. However, in our protocol, all codings are random, which makes it robust against such the attack. 3) Our coding may be implemented by laser pulses (the security is guaranteed even for relatively high-intensity laser pulses). This advantage is due to the fact that the polarizations are completely arbitrary which makes our protocol resistant to both the PNS attack and the attack based on two photon interference [13] .
Protocol.-The procedure for the proposed QKD is as follows:
(a.1) Alice prepares a linearly polarized qubit in its initial state |ψ 0 = |0 , where |0 and |1 represent two orthogonal polarizations of the qubit, and chooses a random angle θ.
(a.2) Alice rotates the polarization of the qubit by θ to bring the state of the qubit to |ψ 1 =Û y (θ)|ψ 0 = cos θ|0 − sin θ|1 , whereÛ y (θ) = cos θ1 1 − i sin θσ y is the unitary operator which rotates the polarization angle along the y axis andσ y is the Pauli-y operator. Alice sends the qubit to Bob.
(a.3) Bob chooses another random angle φ and rotates the polarization of the received qubit by φ; |ψ 2 = U y (φ)|ψ 1 = cos(θ+φ)|0 −sin(θ+φ)|1 . Bob sends the qubit back to Alice.
(a.4) Alice rotates the polarization angle of the qubit by −θ and then encodes the message by further rotating the polarization angle of ±π/4; |ψ 3 = U y (±π/4)Û y (−θ)|ψ 2 . Alice sends the qubit to Bob. (Alice and Bob predetermined that π/4 is, say, "0" and −π/4 is "1".) (a.5) Bob measures the polarization after rotating the polarization by −φ; |ψ 4 =Û y (−φ)|ψ 3 = U y (±π/4)|ψ 0 .Û y (+π/4)|ψ 0 andÛ y (−π/4)|ψ 0 are orthogonal to each other, which enables Bob to read the keys precisely.
By repeating the above protocol k times with different random phases, Alice and Bob share k bits of information whose integrity is not yet verified. In order to verify the integrity of the shared key, the convention is to use a public channel to reveal some part of key bits [1, 11] .
That kind of verification method has two weak points. 1) It usually degrades the efficiency of the key distribution.
2) It does not guarantee the integrity of the remaining key bits. In order to overcome those problems, we shall use the one-way hash function [14] for checking of the integrity of shared key bits. In (a.6) the difference between h a and h b implies that Alice and Bob do not share the exactly same keys. This is due to imperfection in the transmission or to Eve who intervened between Alice and Bob. Figure 1 shows the sketch of the experimental setup for the proposed QKD scheme. The rotation of the polarization is made by Faraday rotator.
Security.-It is worth discussing possible attacks on our protocol. For a perfect channel with single-photon keys, it is obvious that the eavesdropper cannot obtain much information by the intercept-and-resend attack as all three signal transmissions are of random polarizations. In our protocol, the random polarizations lie on the same longitude of the Bloch sphere. The optimum estimation of a equi-longitudinal qubit gives the fidelity 3/4 [16] where the fidelity is one when the estimation is perfect or zero when the original state is orthogonal to the estimation. (In this paper, we will consider the fidelity as the amount of information as in [16, 17] .) The interference can be easily noticed during the protocol (a.6).
It has been pointed out [15] that the two-way QKD such as the ping-pong and the plug-and-play QKD's may suffer from the Trojan attack where an eavesdropper sends a spy pulse and receives the reflected pulse to find sender's unitary operation. In our protocol, a possible attack is that Eve sends a spy pulse to Bob to find the random value φ of Bob's operation. In order to do so, Eve should perform quantum tomography which requires an intense spy pulse. This should be able to be noticed easily.
A single-photon QKD is not very economical not only because it is difficult to have a reliable single-photon source but also because photons may easily be lost due to imperfect channel efficiency. In particular, our protocol has to travel three times between Alice and Bob so the loss may not be negligible. If a key is encoded on a coherent-state pulse, the protocol may be vulnerable against the PNS attack. We thus examine the security of our protocol against the PNS attack. A coherent-state pulse of its amplitude α (α ∈ IR) is
where |n is the photon-number eigenstate. The mean photon number of the pulse is α 2 . Let us assume that the channel efficiency is η for one trip either from Alice to Bob or vice versa. The amplitude then reduces to ηα from α. For convenience, η is taken to be real throughout the paper.
(Attack 1) As usual, we assume that Eve is so superior that her action is limited only by the laws of physics. She replaces the lossy channel by a perfect one and puts a beam splitter of the amplitude transmittivity η in the middle. The reflected field, which is a coherent state with its amplitude 1 − η 2 α, will be the source of information to Eve. In the protocol (a.1)-(a.5), the information transmitted between Alice and Bob is of random polarization. From earlier works [16, 17] , we know that the maximum information one can obtain from a set of identically prepared qubitss whose polarization is completely unknown, depends on the number of qubits. Massar and Popescu [17] found that the maximum amount of information which can be extracted from n identical spin-1/2 particles is I 3 (n) = (n + 1)/(n + 2) when the particle lies on the Bloch sphere. (For n = 1, I 3 = 2/3, which may be compared with 3/4 discussed above for a qubit whose polarization is random on an equi-longitudinal Bloch circle.) However, in our protocol, the photon polarizations lie in the same longitude of the Bloch sphere. Derka et al. [16] found that the optimum state estimation from n equi-longitudinal qubits gives the maximal mean fidelity
Let us first consider the maximum information Eve can get from the Alice→Bob channel in (a.2). The probability P (n) of there being n photons in the coherent state
Then the maximum amount of information Eve can get from the channel in (a.2) is I a.2 = ∞ n=0 P a.2 (n)I 2 (n). Eve has to take the PNS attack on the Bob→Alice channel in (a.3). As Bob has received the attenuated coherent state |ηα , the amplitude of Eve's state is η(1 − η 2 ) 1/2 α. Similarly, the amplitude of Eve's state from tapping the Alice→Bob channel in (a.4) is η 2 (1 − η 2 ) 1/2 α. We can calculate the maximum amounts of information I a.3 and I a. 4 .
It is obvious [11] that the overall maximum information Eve can obtain is bounded by I E = min(I a.2 , I a.3 , I a.4 ), which is plotted in Figs. 2 (solid lines) for various cases. For the realistic channel efficiency η 2 = 0.5, the pulse of its amplitude α = 2.83 gives the average number of photons delivered to Bob about 1 after the process (a.4). Figure 2 (a) shows that Eve's information in this case is bounded by about 0.7, while Alice and Bob always share the perfect information, i.e. the amount of information between Alice and Bob I AB is unity. Of course, for a coherent-state pulse of its amplitude 1, the probability of not having a photon is about 36.8%. However, as Alice and Bob discard the empty qubits, this does not lower the shared information.
As α gets larger, we see that Eve's information becomes unity in Fig. 2 (a) . It is known that the rate of the secure key depends on the difference between I AB and I E [18] . As α gets larger the rate will decrease. Another interesting result seen in Fig. 2 (b) is that the maximum bound for Eve's information does not necessarily grow as the channel becomes less efficient. Eve's information is bounded by the minimum of I a.2 , I a.3 and I a.4 which depend on the intensities of the qubit pulses during (a.2), (a.3) and (a.4), respectively. The intensity of the qubit pulse decreases as the number of its laps between Alice and Bob increases. I E is thus determined by I a.4 , proportional to the intensity of the qubit pulse, (1 − η 2 )η 4 α 2 which maximizes at η 2 = 2/3. When η is small, as many photons are taken out during the initial transmission (a.2), there remain too few photons to give lesser information in the later stage (a.4). The information bound grows as η grows but it eventually converges to I E = 0.5 as η 2 → 1 a shown in Fig. 2 (b) .
(Attack 2) However if Alice and Bob do not randomly check the intensities at (a.2) and (a.3), Eve only needs to make sure the final amplitude, which Bob measures at (a.4), is η 3 α. Then I E is optimized when Eve extracts the same amount of information at each step of (a.2), (a.3) and (a.4) keeping the final amplitude which is measured by Bob. In this case, I E = I a.2 = I a.3 = I a. 4 and the amplitude of Eve's field is always (1 − η 6 )/3 α. The amount of information in this case is plotted as dotted lines in Fig. 2 . In this case, I E monotonously grows as the channel becomes less efficient. For η 2 = 0.5 and α = 2.83, I E ≈ 0.83.
Remarks.-We have considered a new QKD protocol which does not require reconciliation of polarization bases. The two-way communication makes it robust against polarization deformation. All the operations are random and independent, which makes the protocol robust against eavesdropping attacks. The protocol is secure even for a not-so-weak coherent-state pulse, which may overlook a problem, a key has to travel three times between Alice and Bob. We have assumed that the polarization distortion can be completely compensated by two-way transmission of the signal. This idealistic situation deserves further investigation. 
